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Abstract: Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has the potential to enhance road-safety with environment sensing
features provided by embedded devices and sensors. This benignant feature also raises privacy issues
as vehicles announce their fine-grained whereabouts mainly for safety requirements, adversaries can
leverage this to track and identify users. Various privacy-preserving schemes have been designed and
evaluated, for example, mix-zone, encryption, group forming, and silent-period-based techniques.
However, they all suffer inherent limitations. In this paper, we review these limitations and propose
WHISPER, a safety-aware location privacy-preserving scheme that adjusts the transmission range
of vehicles in order to prevent continuous location monitoring. We detail the set of protocols used
by WHISPER, then we compare it against other privacy-preserving schemes. The results show that
WHISPER outperformed the other schemes by providing better location privacy levels while still
fulfilling road-safety requirements.
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1. Introduction
A Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) with its variety of protocols (e.g., IEEE 802.11P,
IEEE 1609) [1] and communication types like Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to
Infrastructure (V2I) [2] has served as a basis for the promising Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
paradigm [3–5]. IoV benefits from VANET to extend the usability range by allowing
non-conventional communications and applications, e.g., Vehicle to Everything (V2X)
communications, to emerge. IoV is an important sub-domain of IoT as well as a clear
example of System of Systems domain [6]. Figure 1 shows V2X external communications
and internal equipments. A vehicle using V2X can enhance road-safety by broadcasting a
Basic Safety Message (BSM) [7,8] beacon message with a 300-m range and a frequency of
1 to 10 BSMs per second from its OBU [9–11]. The data included in BSMs are illustrated
in Figure 2. This allows receiving vehicles to be aware of the potential dangers posed by
nearby vehicles in addition to managing road-congestion, which is considered a high-level
challenge [5] through the network of Road-Side-Units (RSUs).

Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).

Sensors 2021, 21, 2443. https://doi.org/10.3390/s21072443

https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors

Sensors 2021, 21, 2443

2 of 21

Figure 1. Vehicle to Everything (V2X) technology illustration.

Figure 2. Basic Safety Message (BSM) beacon format.

Since BSMs contain fine-grained location data, even though they are useful for road
safety, they do open privacy-related issues: Any entity with eavesdropping capability can
monitor the whereabouts of IoV users. Smart cars’ safety and infotainment applications may
also reveal user private information. Using these data, a system that is ultimately designed
to offer safety and comfort applications to drivers can be abused by third parties, such as
employers, insurance companies, or criminal organizations to track individuals [12]. The
introduction of mechanisms that can preserve location privacy has become a new research
trend that has attracted widespread attention among researchers. Most existing location
privacy schemes, e.g., mix-zone, synchronized schemes, etc., are ineffective in achieving a
high-level of privacy because of the very precise locations included in BSMs and because
of their resource and overhead-consuming characteristics. The better candidate mechanism
used is that of the silent period schemes by ceasing BSMs broadcasting until emerging
from another location with a new pseudo-identifier. However, the major drawback of such
a technique is the sacrifice of safety for the sake of privacy [13].
As safety is a substantial requirement underpinning the introduction of V2X communication, silent period schemes have been received with reservations by the research
community. Our motivation is to find a solution to allow nearby vehicles to be aware
(providing safety) and reduce an adversary opportunity to employ eavesdropping attacks.
The purpose of protecting user location privacy in an IoV context is related to the risk of
user private information being disclosed. Location privacy is directly connected to other
types of privacy. Location privacy leaks can reveal the home and work address of the
driver, some visits to sensitive places, travel habits, times of absence from home, etc. The
correlation of this spatio-temporal information with other data allows an adversary to come
to conclusions about health habits, social contacts, religious beliefs, etc. Protecting user
location privacy has many benefits both to the users and the system. First of all privacy
preservation improves the performance of the IoV system and reduces users’ concerns
about security and privacy. Thus IoVs can attract more users to use their functions and
applications, especially those that are related to safety, promoting further innovation and
development in the automobile industry. In this paper, we propose a mechanism that
reduces the transmission range occasionally to just inform nearby vehicles and prevent the
adversary from tracking users through BSMs. The design of a pseudonym change scheme
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that exploits such a transmission range adjustment feature is inspired by our previous
work [9] where we studied the effect of changing the transmission range using existing
strategies. The novel method that is proposed in the current article, entitled “WHISPER”,
maintains road-safety since vehicles are only hidden from the tracker (occasionally) and not
from close vehicles (always), which makes the use of WHISPER an advantageous feature
that comes in favor of safety and privacy.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
-

We propose a novel location privacy-preserving scheme, entitled WHISPER, that
maintains privacy without sacrificing safety;
We detail the techniques and protocols used by WHISPER for adjusting the transmission range and performing a pseudonym change;
We compare WHISPER to well-known location privacy-preserving schemes such as
cooperative pseudonym change (CPN) [14], Random Silent Period (RSP) [15], and
SLOW [16] in a manhattan-grid model with various densities using location privacy
and QoS as metrics in addition to a comparative table.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review and
discuss existing techniques to address the problem of location privacy in V2X. Then, we
give our proposed system model in Section 3. Next, the proposed WHISPER scheme with
its techniques and protocols are presented in Section 4. After that, WHISPER performances
are analyzed in Section 5. Later in Section 6, we discuss the schemes in the obtained results
perspective. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and gives future work.
2. Related Work
The location privacy problem is being considered as one of the crucial parameters
for the adoption of a successful IoV system. There are a number of efficient privacy
preservation techniques for location based ervices (LBS), however, they are using location obfuscating [17], hiding, anonymizing, and making dummies. These techniques are
explained in [18], however, they are not recommended in the context of achieving safety
via BSMs broadcasting and this is because of the safety-related requirements that do not
recommend risking drivers’ safety for the sake of privacy as using such techniques implies
tricking the adversary alongside the nearby vehicles.
Beresford and Stajano (2003) [19] introduce the mix-group concept, defined as a group
region where vehicles are mixed within that region. However, broadcast beacons that
contain high precision locations still represent a problem for drivers’ privacy. Based on the
mix-group concept, Freudiger et al. (2007) proposed CMIX [20], a location privacy scheme
that uses symmetric key-based cryptography to ensure that beacons are not readable by
the adversary. This approach uses a key shared by RSUs to encrypt BSMs. Their approach
did not consider the internal attacker scenario in addition to heavy infrastructure reliance.
The silent period, a concept that was firstly introduced in the field of wireless LANs
by Huang et al. (2005) [15], ceases any BSM broadcasts for a specific period of time in order
to achieve a good level of privacy. The strategy works well against correlation attacks [21].
However the silent periods introduce a reduction in safety relevant data being shared
within the IoV – reducing the safety properties of the system and potentially invalidating
safety requirements of (“ETSI TR 103 415” [22] and “ETSI TS 103 601” [23] standards). This
safety-privacy trade-off is addressed in our work on WHISPER.
Buttyán et al. (2009) proposed the SLOW strategy [16]. SLOW aims at letting vehicles
choose the best moment to update their pseudonyms. This decision is based on a threshold
of the vehicles speed, assuming that for low speeds the risk of crashes will be low and the
vehicle is allowed to stay silent for a period of time. SLOW, does not necessarily respect
the beaconing frequency of once per second at minimum [9] and this occurs in congested
areas. Eckhoff et al. (2011) proposed Slotswap [24], a strategy that uses a time-slotted
pool to manage pseudonyms by each vehicle. Each slot is used for a period of time with
the possibility to re-use pseudonyms after reaching the last time-slot. The exchange of
pseudonyms between time-slots of different vehicles is also an option of their approach.
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Lu et al. (2012) leveraged the feature of social spots [25] for privacy enhancement.
Social spots are places where vehicles meet more frequently and are characterized with high
densities such as intersections and parking lots. An adversary will be more confused in such
dense areas because the probability to successfully match the old changed pseudonym with
the new one inside a set of vehicles n will be tied inversely with the size of n. In the same
social context, Babaghayou et al. (2019) proposed the Extreme Points Privacy (EPP) [18]
scheme. EPP exploits the feature that IoV users are generally situated in district (where they
live) and since turning the vehicle’s engine results in beaconing, this gives an indication to
the adversary that the user is about to leave their home, thus, the authors propose to cease
beaconing until leaving the district. The probability of leaving a district under different
scenarios are evaluated.
Tomandl et al. (2012) [26] investigated the effects of both mix-zones and silent periods.
The work was also implemented by Emmara et al. (2016) in their privacy extension
PREXT [27] under the name of Coordinated Silent Period (CSP). Emmara et al. (2015) also
proposed their own privacy scheme: Context-Aware Privacy Scheme (CAPS) [28]. CAPS
lets vehicles choose the best opportunity to enter a silence period and to change their
pseudonyms.
Pan and Li (2013) proposed the Cooperative Pseudonym Change (CPN) [14] scheme
that exploits the best opportunity to achieve a synchronous pseudonym change with the
help of neighbors. This way, the adversary loses tracking since vehicles are considered as
the target and are indistinguishable. Yet, vehicles are not fully indistinguishable due to the
fact that they broadcast fine-grained location. This means that an attacker is still able to
identify the vehicles based on their precise location.
Emmara et al. (2016) also apply the silent period mechanism [15] to propose the
Random Silent Period (RSP) scheme [27]. RSP is based on entering silence for a random
range of time, then, it performs the pseudonym change. The scheme’s nature is considered
as a spatial mix-zone because when vehicles enter the silence period and leave it after some
time this implies disappearing from a point and emerging from another point which is the
same idea with spatial mix-zones.
Another scheme was proposed by Zidani et al. (2018) [29] which is the Estimation
of Neighbors Position privacy scheme with an Adaptive Beaconing approach (ENeP-AB)
strategy that uses the number of neighbors and the predicted positions d as a pseudonym
change trigger. Zidani et al. had also compared ENeP-AB to some other strategies like
CAPs and the mix-context enhanced.
The effect of pseudonym change is mostly beneficial to privacy, however, Schoch et al.
(2006) [30] shed light on some adverse consequences of intense pseudonym changes on
the overall network performances and geo-routing protocols. Their results show that high
pseudonym change frequencies negatively affect the system performances. Following a
different direction, Zhang et al. (2019) [7] had touched upon the problem of collisions that
occur while sending BSMs with high frequency, more precisely the problems occurring on
the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer. They demonstrated the issue and proposed a
hybrid MAC Protocol and showed its effectiveness via analysis and simulation means.
Goudarzi and Asgari (2018) proposed a congestion control mechanisms algorithm
called (NOPC) [31] that is based on the beacon transmission power control. The scheme
performs well in the bandwidth usage and fairness, nevertheless, its influence was not evaluated versus the achieved location privacy. In the same area, SAB Mussa et al. (2014) [32]
shed light on the challenging issues that have to be addressed in the beaconing and
transmission range control in the vehicular domain but without mentioning the privacy requirement [33]. A summary of recent location privacy-preserving schemes for the Internet
of Vehicles is presented in Table 1. In the same table the major advantages and drawbacks
of all these methods are also presented.
Based on the methods that were analyzed in the previous paragraphs and the ones
presented in Table 1, it is obvious that the reviewed schemes have serious limitations.
The silent period schemes are the most promising solutions but at the cost of road-safety
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which does not make them welcomed by the research community. Moreover, pseudonym
schemes on the other hand cannot reassure privacy preservation since an adversary can
still track vehicles that are broadcasting their locations even if they change pseudonyms
by performing the so-called linking attack. The proposed idea in this research paper
(WHISPER) comes to fill these limitations, by ensuring privacy along with a high roadsafety level, by acting as a silent period scheme on some occasions.
Table 1. Comparison of related works.
Year

2007

Scheme

Freudiger et al. [20]

Network Model
Vehicular
networks

Technique Used

Pros (+)

Cons (−)

Symmetric key-based
cryptography

+ Provides location
privacy

− The proposed
scheme did not
consider the internal
attacker scenario
− Intrusion detection
is not considered

2009

Buttyán et al. [16]

Vehicular
networks

Pseudonym changing
scheme

+ Ensures both silent
periods and
synchronized
pseudonym change in
time and space

2011

Eckhoff et al.
(2011) [24]

Intelligent
transportation
systems

A time-slotted pool to
manage pseudonyms
by each vehicle

+ Affordable location
privacy

− Resistance against
Sybil attacks is not
considered

Lu et al. [25]

Vehicular
networks

The feature of social
spots, which are places
where vehicles meet
more frequently

+ Provides location
privacy

− Limited analysis
against threat models

Pan and Li [14]

Vehicular
networks

Cooperative
pseudonym change
scheme based on the
number of neighbors

+ Provides anonymity

− Intrusion detection
is not considered

Ferrag and
Ahmim [34]

Vehicular
peer-to-peer social
network

Searchable encryption
with vehicle proxy
re-encryption

+ Provide privacy for
resources,
authentication and
data integrity of the
demand’s source

− Limited analysis
with threat models
against botnet attacks

+ Provides location
privacy

− Limited analysis
against threat models

2012

2013

2017

2018

Zidani et al. [29]

Vehicular ad-hoc
network

Estimation of
neighbors position
privacy scheme with
an adaptive beaconing
approach

2019

Babaghayou et al. [18]

Vehicular
networks

Location-privacy
evaluation within the
extreme points privacy

+ Provides location
privacy

− Limited analysis
against threat models

− Resistance against
DDoS attacks

− Resistance against
Botnet attacks

2020

Aman et al. [35]

Internet of vehicles

Physical unclonable
functions

+ Reduces the
overhead of
authentication and
improves the
throughput of
application layer
packets

2020

Song et al. [33]

Internet of vehicles

Fog-based identity
authentication scheme

+ Reduces the burden
on the traffic control
center
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Table 1. Cont.
Year

Scheme

Network Model

Technique Used

Pros (+)

Cons (−)

+ Secures against a
passive/active
adversary through
various security
analysis

− Communication and
computation overhead

2020

Sutrala et al. [36]

Internet of vehicles

Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC)
technique

2020

Dwivedi et al. [37]

Internet of vehicles

Blockchain technology

+ Supports data
immutability property

− The limited analysis
against the threat
models

Zhang and Li [38]

Internet of vehicles

- Task allocation and
data aggregation
mechanism
- Robin Steiner
bargaining game
model

+ Encourages selfish
nodes to perform data
transmission and
reduce time delay

− Limited analysis
against threat models

Vasudev et al. [39]

Vehicle to Vehicle
(V2V)
communication in
the Internet of
Vehicles

Lightweight mutual
authentication
protocol

+ Secure
communication, while
minimizing
computational cost

− Limited analysis
against threat models

Kamal et al. [39]

V2V
communication in
the Internet of
Vehicles

Blockchain technology
and channel
characteristics of
wireless networks in
V2V communication

+ Provides real time
adversary detection
within the network

− Energy and
computation overhead

Bagga et al. [40]

Internet of
Vehicles-enabled
intelligent
transportation
system

Mutual authentication
and key agreement
protocol

+ Secures against a
passive/active
adversary through
various security
analysis

− Communication
and computational
overhead

2020

2020

2021

2021

3. System Model
In this section, we define and describe the Overall System Model comprised of a
network model, the threat/attacker model, a set of assumptions that are taken while
making such a research study in addition to technical details and a mathematical model
that reflects the fundamentals of using certificates under an IoV system.
3.1. Network Model
The network model used in this paper is illustrated in Figure 3, and contains the
following entities:
•

•

•

Vehicles: They are the basic units of the VANET paradigm which provides a platform
to the V2X applications. The communication is done via the 802.11p [3] standard and
can perform Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications. The set of vehicles is defined as V = {v1 , v2 , . . . vn }.
System Authorities: They are the the entities related to the law-side (e.g., governmental
bodies) that have different resources, tasks, and roles like: Distributing, issuing,
revoking pseudonyms, etc. [41]. It is also important that the system authorities
almost always are able to fulfill the accountability requirement in order to track down
and determine misbehaving users [42].
Infrastructure: Composed by different components and stations, its role is to relay and
facilitate the connectivity between the vehicles and any potential attached network entity. The most interesting feature is the Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications.
Additionally, V2X communications may exploit the infrastructure.
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Figure 3. The different entities of the vehicular network.

3.2. Threat Model
The threat model is shown in Figure 4 and is composed from the following elements:

Figure 4. Threat model and its resources, capabilities, and coverage.

•

Tracker: The malicious element in the system, even though it is not active, can still
execute many influencing attacks such as eavesdropping, tracking, profile-generation,
etc. In most researches, the Global Passive Adversary (GPA) [10] is considered as
the adversary type used while evaluating their own schemes. The GPA is a strong
adversary that covers almost the whole map (or at least, the region of interest) and
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•

•

can obtain every sent message passively, i.e., no data forgery, modification, or creation
is executed by him.
Eavesdropping stations: They are stations capable of collecting the transmitted BSMs
where all of the coverage mode, the emplacement, and the transmission range of
vehicles do affect the amount of the collected packets.
Tracker resources: They are the various materials and software used in conjunction
with the eavesdropping stations. They can be high performance servers, tracking
algorithms and methods, etc.

3.3. Assumptions
We put a set of assumptions for what is included in this research:
-

-

-

Vehicles are able to adjust their transmission range by changing the used transmission power.
The adversary is setting eavesdropping stations in accordance to the standardization
(300 m of transmission range for vehicles).
The distributed eavesdropping stations do overlap in 30 m and have a moderate
coverage mode to collect much BSMs by effectively exploiting the resources. This is
illustrated in Figure 5.
At a given time, the adversary can exclude the remaining of the map and only focuses
on a region of interest. This is done at the aim of targeting only specific vehicles for
better calculations and to well-exploit the resources (it is shown in Figure 5).
Vehicles use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates mechanism to communicate,
thus, changing the used pseudonym implies using a new certificate. This later is
assumed to be issued from a trusted authority by doing the certificates refill request.

Figure 5. The used coverage mode (moderate mode) details.

3.4. Certificates Management
Since the use of pseudonyms implies the use of certificates, a better management
is envisioned in order not to affect the functioning of the whole system. With this said,
having a large set of certificates with less consumption frequency would be preferred,
hence minimizing their refill requests. In order to quantify the used certificates for each
vehicle per unit of time, an estimation is highly needed. For that aim, we provide the
following equations related to the used certificates:
-

The estimated number of certificates per day NbrCertsday without changing the certificate by a number other than that of the expiration is calculated as in Equation (1):
NbrCerts_day = NbrCerts_m × DrivTime_day

(1)
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-

where NbrCerts_m is the number of used certificate per minute and DrivTime_day is
the estimated amount of time (in minutes) that the user is going to drive per day.
The number of necessary certificates per year, assuming that a normal refill is made
each year, is like in Equation (2):
NbrCerts_year = NbrCerts_day × 365.

-

From here, the estimated remaining certificates after d days since the last yearly refill
(NbrRemainCerts(d)) is calculated as written in Equation (3):
NbrRemainCerts(d) = NbrCerts_year − d × NbrCerts_day.

-

(2)

(3)

However, certificates may also get invalid due to a certificate change (triggered by
a pseudonym change for example) and thus, the exact remaining certificates after
d days since the last yearly refill (RealNbrRemainCerts(d)) can be calculated as in
Equation (4):
RealNbrRemainCerts(d) = NbrCerts_year − d × NbrCerts_day − NbrCerts_chngd

(4)

where NbrCerts_chngd is the number of times the certificate got changed due to a
reason other than a normal expiration.
4. The Proposed WHISPER Strategy
WHISPER uses the change of transmission power to preserve or at least augment
the level of location privacy in addition to ensuring road-safety while driving. Vehicles
monitor the neighborhood and their proper speeds on-the-fly in order to adjust their
beacons transmission range. This is because the adversary, in our assumptions, distributes
eavesdropping stations intelligently and economically according to the standardization
(that vehicles transmit with 300 m of range). Thus, when driving in low speeds the vehicle
(i.g., vi ) may reduce, according to the value of its speed (and the surrounding vehicles’
speeds), its own range to ensure that:
•

•

•
•

The safety of its neighbor vehicle(s) (e.g., v j ) is preserved unlike the case of the silent
period schemes that do not make much safety-considerations when going to enter
silent. This is fulfilled by continuously checking its own speed. Thus, when in high
speeds, the risk of a sudden crash will be high, which is why vi ought to be visible
earlier to the surrounding vehicles (v j ).
Its own safety. This is fulfilled by the neighbor vehicle(s) v j that are using the same
behavior as vi while driving in different speeds. They aim, as a consequence, to inform
vi earlier when they are driving in high speeds. Once it has received a BSM with a
powerful transmission range, vi takes that as a parameter and adjusts, in its role, its
own transmission range based on that parameter and on its own speed. By doing so,
vi will be visible to the other neighbors, v j as well.
The two aforementioned points lead to a collective awareness that will ensure the
safety of both vi and its neighbor v j .
To benefit and exploit the already deployed eavesdropping mode, as these eavesdropping stations will not be able to collect BSMs all the time even if the vehicles are inside
the area of the eavesdropping station. This is because each eavesdropping station is
placed at the aim of intercepting every sent BSM in the range of 300 m.

4.1. System Initialization
Each vehicle vi is equipped with M certificates and each one of them is defined as
(Certi,j ) where j represents the i-th certificate of vi . Thus, each vehicle vi has a set of
certificates Ci defined as follows: Ci = {Certi,1 , Certi,2 , . . . Certi,m }. When referring to a
pseudonym change, this implies the use of another certificate.
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Before we dive into the detailed modus-operandi of WHISPER, we define the set
of concepts (find them in Table 2) that are key-parameters used to determine the exact
behavior of WHISPER.
Table 2. WHISPER keywords, concepts, and detailed definitions.
The Concept

Its Definition

The different speed levels (km/h)
My_Pos and His_Pos (x, y, z)
My_Speed and His_Speed (km/h)
Speed (km/h)
Dist (m)
Calc_Dist( A, B) (m)
BSM.X () (depends)
GeneralNR (m)

Low (≥0 & <18), Medium (≥18 & <36), beyond-Medium (≥36 & <54), High (≥54)
The position of vi which does the calculation and v j which sends the BSM
The speed of vi which does the calculation and v j which sends the BSM
The highest speed that was encountered while vi was waiting
The distance between the sending vehicle v j and the receiving vehicle vi
Calculates the distance between point A and B
X () is the method applied on BSM to retrieve different fields like position, speed, etc.
A virtual range with the same value for each receiving vehicle vi . This range determines
whether a sending vehicle v j is considered as a “General Neighbor” to vi or not
If v j is inside that range when sending its BSM, then it is considered to be vi ’s
General Neighbor
A virtual range with the same value for each receiving vehicle vi . This range determines
whether a sending vehicle v j is considered as a “Road Neighbor” to vi or not
v j is only considered as a Road Neighbor to vi if it is inside the RoadNR range and if
it and vi share the same road segment
A virtual range with the same value for each receiving vehicle vi . This range determines
whether a sending vehicle v j is considered as a “Close Neighbor” to vi or not. v j is only
considered as a Close Neighbor if it is inside the CloseNR range. Noting that CloseNR
range ought to be very small in order to let both vi and v j be as much indistinguishable
as possible to confuse the attacker when doing the pseudonym change action
A local variable that each vehicle vi has. Being True means that vi is currently at the
proximity of another vehicle v j . In the other case, when vi is alone (with regard to the
CloseNR range), its value becomes False (to achieve road-safety, entertainment,
congestion-aware actions, etc.)
This procedure uses the received BSM packet for the IoV objectives and requirements
(to achieve road-safety, entertainment, congestion-aware actions, etc.)

RoadNR (m)

CloseNR (m)

Close (boolean)

Proccess_Beacon( BSM) (procedure)
OBU_Is_On (boolean)
Beacon_Interval_Time (s)
Prepare_Beacon( BSM) (Beacon)
nic.mac80211p.txPower (milliwatt)
Counter (number)
De f _Val (number)
Send_Beacon( BSM) (Beacon)

A true or false value which means a sending vehicle vi is on or off respectively
An amount of time in where vi is waiting before sending the next BSM
Generates a BSM packet that will be ready for broadcasting
The transmission power given to the network interface used to control the transmission
range of vi
A counter variable used later on to decide the pseudonym change action
The default value of counter. It is used to both reinitialize counter and to do a test to
find out the eligibility of vi for changing its pseudonym
Gives the BSM packet to the lower layers which will broadcast it to the neighbors

Checking_Pseudonym_Change_Trigger () Checking whether the trigger of vi for changing its pseudonym is met or not
(procedure)
Pseudonym_Change() (procedure)
Once the conditions are met and once it is executed correctly, vi acquires a new
pseudonym (and certificate respectively)

Generally speaking, in WHISPER, every vehicle vi can be in one of the following
main states:
•
•

•

Vehicle ON: Is the state when a vehicle is turned on (to be ready for driving).
Listening: Once on, vi keeps monitoring the transmission medium to detect any
transmitted BSM. Both its neighbor(s) status (found in their transmitted BSMs) and its
own speed.
Receiving BSMs: When receiving a BSM from v j , vi proceeds into diverse calculations
at the aim of knowing the status of v j .
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•

•

•
•

•

Adjusting the transmission power: In this status, vi takes as parameters its own speed
and the neighbors’ speed and may, accordingly, adjust its transmission range in order
to ensure road-safety and preserve location-privacy of the present vehicles.
Checking pseudonym change condition: This status comes after the Beacon_Interval_Time
expires. vi will check its eligibility for a pseudonym (and certificate) change. When
favorable, vi moves into the next status.
Pseudonym change: In this status, a pseudonym change takes place and the BSM will
be sent right after.
Sending a BSM: This status happens after the Pseudonym change action. Sometimes, the
pseudonym change trigger will not be satisfied, thus, vi just sends the BSM. In both
scenarios, vi returns to the next status (Listening) afterwards.
Vehicle OFF: The status where a vehicle is turned off and thus the ending status.

A state diagram is presented in Figure 6 which gives a better illustration and understanding on the aforementioned states and the existing transitions.

Figure 6. The state diagram of WHISPER.

4.2. Receiving Beacon Messages Protocol
Vehicles are always ready to receive BSMs. When receiving a BSM, the receiving
vehicle vi considers the sender’s position and calculates the distance between itself and the
sender. By doing this simple calculation, vi will be able to get a set of useful information that
will determine its behavior. The pseudo-code of receiving a beacon message in WHISPER
is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The main conclusions that vi is going to have after parsing
the BSM sent by v j are the following:
•
•
•
•

•

Knowing the distance between itself and v j .
Whether to consider v j ’s BSM for transmission power adjustment or just ignore it.
It considers v j ’s BSM for transmission power adjustment if Dist is less than or equal
to GeneralNR (shown in the scenario that is illustrated in Figure 7).
It considers v j ’s BSM for transmission power adjustment if Dist is less than or equal to
RoadNR but also share the same road segment with each other (shown in the scenario
that is illustrated in Figure 8).
It considers itself eligible for the pseudonym change if Dist is less than or equal to
CloseNR. It does change Close to True as a consequence.

This protocol is called whenever vi receives a BSM generated by v j and with each
call, less than 10 instructions are executed thus a linear complexity per each call O(10).
With this said, by receiving ( R) BSM, the complexity of the whole protocol will be as in
Equation (5):

O( R × 10) = O(n).

(5)
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This indicates that the ReceivingBeaconMessages protocol is neither time nor resources consumer.

Figure 7. WHISPER behavior in the presence and influence of general neighbors on the transmission
range adjustment.

Figure 8. WHISPER behavior in the presence and influence of road neighbors on the transmission
range adjustment.

Algorithm 1 Receiving Beacon
1:

procedure R ECEIVING _B EACON ( BEACON * BSM )

2:

His_Pos ← BSM.SenderPos();

3:

Dist ← Calc_Dist( My_Pos, His_pos);

4:

if (( Dist

<=

GeneralNR) OR (( Dist

HisRoadID )) then
5:

His_Speed ← BSM.SenderSpeed();

6:

Speed ← Max ( My_Speed, His_Speed);

7:

if ( Dist <= CloseNR) then
Close ← TRUE;

8:
9:

end if

10:

end if

11:

Process_Beacon(BSM);

12:

end procedure

<=

RoadNR) AND ( MyRoadID

=
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4.3. Transmission Range Adjustment Protocol
Each vehicle vi , and after the Beacon_Interval_Time expires, will send a BSM to inform
the nearby vehicles about its location. Particularly, WHISPER adjusts the transmission
range prior to the final BSM broadcast. The adjustment is done each time a BSM is received
by vi as explained before. When going to broadcast, vi uses the value of Speed to decide
the appropriate transmission range (between all of the four levels: Low, Medium, beyondMedium, and High). Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of sending a BSM after making
the transmission range adjustment step. Additionally, Speed is reinitialized to 0 after that
and Checking_Pseudonym_Change_Trigger () is called during this protocol and that is to
see the eligibility of changing vi ’s pseudonym (and certificate respectively). Moreover,
Counter is decreased depending on the value of Speed and this is to trigger the pseudonym
change (will be seen in the next point). However, if Speed is at max level, there will be no
meaning for changing the pseudonym and that is because the attacker is able to collect
every sent beacon (the maximum transmission range is used) and that is why Counter is
reinitialized to its default value De f _Val.
This protocol is called whenever vi Beacon_Interval_Time expires and thus, one time
per call. However, it calls, in its role, the Checking_Pseudonym_Change_Trigger () protocol.
In total, there are 7 instructions without counting the called protocol (O(7)). With this said,
the complexity of the TransmissionRangeAdjustment protocol is defined as in Equation (6):

O(1 × (7 + O(Checking_Pseudonym_Change_Trigger ()))) = O(Checking_Pseudonym_Change_Trigger ()).

(6)

This indicates that the TransmissionRangeAdjustment protocol does depend on the
PseudonymChangeTrigger protocol.
Algorithm 2 Sending Beacon
1:

procedure S ENDING _B EACON

2:

while (OBU_Is_On) do

3:

Wait( Beacon_Interval_Time);

4:

Prepare_Beacon(BSM);

5:

Speed ← Max ( My_Speed, Speed);

6:

if (Speed < 18) then

7:

nic.mac80211p.txPower ← 0.2;

8:

Counter ← Counter − 5;

9:

else if (Speed < 36) then

10:

nic.mac80211p.txPower ← 0.8;

11:

Counter ← Counter − 10;

12:
13:
14:

else if (Speed < 54) then
nic.mac80211p.txPower ← 3.1;
else

15:

nic.mac80211p.txPower ← 7;

16:

Counter ← De f _Val;

17:

end if

18:

Speed ← 0;

19:

Checking_Pseudonym_Change_Trigger();

20:

Send_Beacon(BSM);

21:
22:

end while
end procedure
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4.4. Pseudonym Change Trigger Protocol
In order to avoid wasting pseudonyms (certificates) in an inappropriate opportunity,
finding an almost good opportunity requires that the pseudonym change trigger must be
implemented delicately. Algorithm 3 shows, in a pseudo-code, the way vehicles perform a
check to see the eligibility for changing their pseudonyms. When the trigger Counter reaches
or drops below (0) (which is an indicator that vi was sending BSMs with a short range
for some important period of time) vi changes its pseudonym then initializes the trigger
Counter. This whole process provides high confusion chances since the pseudonym change
is performed not in the favor of the tracker (see the scenario illustrated in Figure 9). The
PseudonymChangeTrigger protocol is used each time the TransmissionRangeAdjustment is
executed. Its complexity depends on a small and fixed number of instructions (5), thus, can
be defined as in Equation (7):
O(5) = O(1).
(7)
The PseudonymChangeTrigger protocol has O(1) as a complexity.

Figure 9. WHISPER, pseudonym change process triggered by a close neighbor’s status.

Algorithm 3 Checking Pseudonym Change Trigger
1:

procedure C HECKING _P SEUDONYM _C HANGE _T RIGGER

2:

if ((Counter <= ( De f _Val/2)) AND (Close)) then

3:

Counter ← De f _Val;

4:

Pseudonym_Change();

5:

else if (Counter <= 0) then

6:

Counter ← De f _Val;

7:

Pseudonym_Change();

8:

end if

9:

Close ← FALSE;

10:

end procedure

5. Performance Evaluation
To validate the performances of WHISPER, we use simulation runs in a manhattan grid
model created using the NETEDIT script included in SUMO; the mobility simulator [43].
SUMO is considered as one of the most credible and realistic mobility simulators. The
mobility and environment information used for the simulation are presented in Table 3.
The manhattan grid model consists of 9 intersected roads with attached segments where
each segment has a length of 200 m.
Concerning the network simulator, we use OMNeT++ [44]; the component is c++
based and discrete events simulator. OMNet++ allows the integration of diverse frame-
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works depending on the simulation nature like Veins [45], which is the vehicular network
simulator. Veins acts as a bridge between the mobility simulator SUMO and the network
simulator OMNet++. We also employ the PREXT extension [27] that is developed by Emmara et al.; a Veins extension that integrates a set of (1) location privacy schemes, (2) some
privacy metrics such as the traceability and the normalized traceability (described in [46]),
and (3) a Quality of Service (QoS) metric (the consumption of pseudonyms/certificates).
A block diagram is elaborated in order to facilitate the comprehension of the interaction
between the different simulation tools (shown in Figure 10). Based on PREXT, WHISPER
is evaluated and compared against some other schemes under the same environmental
condition using the aforementioned metrics. The schemes’ parameters and the evaluation
metrics are also presented in Table 3.

Figure 10. The block diagram of the different used simulation tools.
Table 3. Simulation parameters and values.
Parameters
Vehicles Number
Mobility

Insertion method
Mobility Model
Used Map

Environment

Map size
Simulation Time
Privacy metrics

Evaluation
Pseudonym usage/
consumption
SLOW
RSP
Strategy

CPN
WHISPER

Value
Simultaneously = 50, 100, 150, 200
Total = 100, 200, 300, 400
Quasi-Instant
(first second insertion)
RandomTrips with minimum
distance = 1500 m
Manhattan grid model
9 roads, 200 m per segment
2000 × 2000 m2
4 km2
300 s
Traceability
N_Traceability
Number of changed-pseudonyms
Speed threshold = 8 m/s
Silence threshold = 5 s
Pseudonym duration = 60 s
Silence period = from 3 to 9 s randomly
Neighbors radius = 100 m
Neighbors threshold = 2
Road neighbors radius = 100 m
General neighbors radius = 30 m
Close neighbors radius = 30 m
Counter default value = 50
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5.1. The Adversary’s Achieved Traceability
Traceability, the location privacy metric used in this study, is defined as the correctness
of an adversary to build the target vehicle’s traces using its eavesdropped beacons [46].
The results, provided in Figure 11 show that WHISPER outperformed SLOW, RSP, and
CPN in the traceability metric with a clear difference (ranging in the interval of 10% to
20%). An important remark is that at dense situations (e.g., with the density of 200 vehicle),
the traceability gets augmented a bit. The reason behind the decrease in the privacy level is
due to the higher density of vehicles, which can help the attacked collect BSMs from the
legitimate cars.
In general, as presented in Figure 11, WHISPER performs better in terms of the level of
privacy that it offered since it achieves a traceability ranging in the interval of 10% to 20%.
We interpret this as being WHISPER reducing the vehicle’s transmission range according
to its and/or the neighbor vehicles’ speeds (according to the safety situation) followed
by CPN, RSP, then SLOW, in addition we observe that the traceability decreases when
augmenting the number of vehicles in SLOW. The reason is that, in high densities, vehicles
would drive with lower speeds, thus, SLOW performs better.

Figure 11. The achieved traceability by SLOW, Random Silent Period (RSP), Cooperative Pseudonym
Change (CPN), and WHISPER within different densities.

5.2. The Adversary’s Achieved Normalized Traceability
As some vehicles may not perform the pseudonym change, building their traces
becomes easy, thus, excluding them gives more fairness to the real level of privacy [46]; that
is the normalized traceability. With this definition, our conducted simulation under the
normalized traceability aims to give a more credible and better privacy-reflecting metric
to quantify the achieved privacy level of WHISPER, SLOW, RSP, and CPN (shown in
Figure 12).
As stated above, by taking the case of just the vehicles which did change their
pseudonyms, we get the achieved normalized traceability as shown in Figure 12. The
results always give WHISPER the leading position since it outperforms the other schemes
but this time by achieving an even higher privacy level represented in a lower than 10% of
normalized traceability. The same order of performance remains: CPN, RSP, then SLOW.
However, SLOW has achieved better-normalized traceability of about 30% due to removing
vehicles that did not change their pseudonyms at all from the calculation.
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Figure 12. The achieved normalized traceability by SLOW, RSP, CPN, and WHISPER within different densities.

5.3. Pseudonym Consumption
Also considered is the QoS metric. The pseudonym consumption has multiple effects
and impacts like the use of different pseudonyms (thus, certificates), extra-communications
with the corresponding authorities to refill pseudonyms, affecting the routing algorithms [30],
etc. For this reason, the pseudonym consumption metric is crucial. With a clear view,
Figure 13 shows that SLOW is the less-pseudonym consuming scheme followed by RSP
and WHISPER respectively, while CPN had a considerable high pseudonyms consumption
level. We argue this by the scheme’s nature, when the trigger of k neighbors is satisfied,
a pseudonym change is performed and as k was taken as 2 by the default parameters, a lot
of pseudonym changes occurred.

Figure 13. The pseudonyms changes (consumption) evaluation of CPN, WHISPER, RSP, and SLOW
within different densities.
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6. Discussion
For an overall investigation, the performances of CPN, RSP, SLOW, and WHISPER
were evaluated in terms of (1) location privacy that gives WHISPER the leading in both
(a) traceability and (b) normalized traceability and (2) QoS comes in the favor of SLOW.
CPN, under the default parameters (i.e., k = 2), has resulted in a very high pseudonym
consumption, thus, considered as a non-wise choice for a deployed pseudonym scheme.
The results, clearly show that WHISPER has a very good level of privacy since it achieves
traceability ranging in the interval of 10% to 20%. In terms of normalized traceability,
WHISPER outperformed the other schemes achieving an even higher privacy level.
Despite WHISPER consuming more pseudonyms (with a remarkably low amount in
general) than SLOW and RSP, having it a very high location privacy level represented in
the traceability and the normalized traceability gives it the leading position. Thus, we can
say that WHISPER, as also compared and summarized in Table 4, has outperformed the
other schemes especially in both the safety and location privacy that are known to be on
the top of the security requirements.
Table 4. A brief comparison of SLOW, RSP, CPN, and WHISPER strategies according to a set of metrics.
Staying
Silent

Monitoring
Neighbors

Pseudonyms
Consumption

Safety
Ensuring

More Efficiency
When

SLOW [16]

3

7

Low

7

Driving in low speeds, hence, keeping silence

RSP [15]

3

7

Low

7

Entering silence and changing pseudonyms
synchronously

CPN [14]

7

3

Very high

3

The set of vehicles happens to be large

WHISPER

7

3

Medium

3

Low transmission power condition is satisfied

Except for the evaluation comparison, WHISPER is an important solution that offers
privacy preservation while maintaining at the same time road-safety. This is achieved since
vehicles are only hidden from the tracker (occasionally) and not from the close vehicles
(always), which makes the use of WHISPER an advantageous method that comes in favor
of safety and privacy.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, WHISPER, a novel location privacy-preserving scheme that is based on
reducing the transmission range while sending the safety beacons was proposed. We presented WHISPER protocols, techniques, and algorithms and compared them against other
methods, namely CPN, RSP, and SLOW in terms of the location privacy level (traceability,
normalized traceability) and QoS (pseudonyms consumption) metrics. WHISPER clearly
outperformed the other schemes in location privacy evaluation, which is an important
security requirement, but consumed, lightly, more pseudonyms than SLOW and RSP as
the QoS evaluation demonstrated. Furthermore, WHISPER showed its robustness during
the evaluation and also provided (1) road safety that is missed by all other silent period
schemes in conjunction with (2) location privacy.
The reason why WHISPER is a road-safety mechanism is that the vehicle is only hidden
from the tracker (occasionally) and not from close vehicles (always) which made the use of
WHISPER (or at least, the change of transmission range protocol) an advantageous feature
that works in favor of safety and privacy alike.
As this new technique has not been exploited before in the privacy field, we intend on
evaluating the achieved location privacy level versus an internal attacker i.e., when vehicles
act as malicious eavesdropping stations in order to bypass the reduction of transmission
range and increase the coverage of the attacker. Also, some of the values (e.g., existing
in Algorithm 2) are set heuristically, evaluating the performance by optimally adjusting
those values dynamically would certainly enhance the obtained privacy level of WHISPER. Moreover technologies like blockchain [47], cryptography [48], IDSs [49], and Edge
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Computing [50] which are widely recognized as key enablers for IoV could be integrated
or used in parallel with our solution. Finally, using other metrics like the number of sent
BSMs, the number of verified signatures, and evaluating WHISPER’s performance under
different scenarios like the free-way model are some of our future plans.
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